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The Nature of the Subject: 
"Judgment" and the Law of Specification 
in Kant's Critique of Judgment 
Marlena G. Corcoran 
KANT'S Critique of Judgment is not about objects?beautiful or other 
wise?but about the judging subject. I would like to make two points 
about the reflexive relation between nature and the subject ?that is, the 
judging subject?based on paragraphs six and seven of Section V from 
the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment. The first point concerns 
Kant's use of the term "Urteil," or "judgment," and related terms. The sec 
ond point concerns the law of specification, and what Kant calls the "gl?ck 
licher Zufall," or "fortunate coincidence," between nature and the subject. 
One way to investigate the relation between nature and the subject is to 
look closely at the term "judgment," since judgment is the activity that 
brings nature and the subject together. As someone from one of the philo 
logical disciplines, I tend to answer the question, "What is judgment? 
" 
by 
asking, "What does the word 'judgment' mean?" ?more precisely, what 
might we learn by examining the German word "Urteilskraft"? 
I'm not suggesting that German words have a mystical quality that 
makes Kant's meaning clear to anyone who reads the German original. But 
there does seem to me to be a danger in the increasingly common practice 
of reading texts only in translation, or in summaries of translations. The 
word 
"Urteilskraft," or judgment, is itself very important. It marks the 
transition between Kant's first two Critiques of the human faculties, 
namely the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason, and 
the third Critique, that of Judgment. It is important to understand all we 
can about the difference between reason and judgment ?beginning with 
the words themselves. The philological inquiry that follows examines 
how Kant's words are bound up with Kant's argument; and for such a 
project, we must briefly return to the German. 
The word "Urteil" has the same legal connotations as the English word 
"judgment"; and I am not the first to remark that an entire juridical 
vocabulary is here employed by Kant: words like "law," "domain," 
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"legitimate," and so on. Close reading bears out that the choice of the 
word 
"judgment" is bound up with a textual disposition to construe such 
activity as lawful and binding. 
But I'd like to caution against a possible misreading of the word "Urteil." 
"Teil" means 
"part"; but the prefix "ur-" is problematic. "Ur-teil" is not a 
construction along the lines of German words such as "Ursprache" or 
"Ursprung" that have become familiar to speakers of English. "Ursprache" 
means 
"original language," and "Ursprung" means "origin"; in both of 
these cases the prefix "ur-" means "original." However, the philosophical 
and judicial term "Urteil" has a very different history; the prefix is actually 
not the same "ur-," and the word does not mean "original part." That is, it 
would be a mistake, both philologically and philosophically, to think that 
the word "Urteil" suggests a pristine and legitimating origin for judgment. 
"Urteil" comes from "er-teilen," which is comparable to the modern "ver 
teilen," meaning "to divide into parts" 
? 
much like our Greek-derived Eng 
lish word 
"analyze." "Erteilen" is Middle High German. There are older 
forms of the word. It is noteworthy that before Kant, the term "urteilen" 
was 
widespread not only in German legal discourse, but in the writings of 
German mystics. The prefix "er-" means "heraus... aus," roughly "forth out 
of," and like the modern prefix "ver-," implies a movement of some kind. 
Both the German "Urteil" and the English "ordeal" come from Common 
Teutonic words for the kind of trial by physical test common to the Teu 
tonic peoples (OED). More generally, the modern German word "Teil," 
meaning "part," shares a history with the English word "deal." We can see 
the relation in such expressions as "a good deal of the time," meaning "a 
large part of the time," or in "Let's make a deal," which nicely combines 
the senses of 
"dividing into parts," and "adjudicating." These two senses 
taken together remind me of the great judge Solomon, and the case of the 
disputed baby. In a renowned "Urteil," Solomon "adjudicated" the case by 
offering to "divide the baby into parts." 
"Urteilskraft," or the faculty of judgment, contrasts with the faculty of 
reason, or 
"Vernunft." "Vernunft" comes from the same etymological line as 
"vernehmen," which means "grasp." One can grasp a thing, and presumably 
one thing; but the activity of dealing out parts is rather different. Another 
word for 
"grasp" is "fassen," and in the passage at hand, "Fassungskraft," or 
the ability to grasp something, occurs toward the end of the first para 
graph, at a point when the discussion reaches what Kant sees to be the pos 
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sible limits of understanding. "Urteilskraft," or the ability to divide into 
parts, begins paragraph two: it is close by, but somewhat different. Once 
again, judgment has to do not with a thing, but with dividing into parts; 
and the transition is from grasping to dealing. 
This contrast is also borne out by close consideration of Kant's differential 
use of neighboring terms in these two paragraphs. In writing about 
reason, 
"Vernunft," Kant uses other formulations related to the etymologi 
cal sense of 
"Vernunft" as "grasping." Notably, in connection with "Ver 
nunft," Kant uses the verbs "greifen" and "begreifen," which also mean 
"grasp." By contrast, Kant's discussion of judgment, "Urteilskraft," is con 
ducted in terms of "division," with words like "Verschiedenheit," and even 
"einteilen," where we hear again "Teil," or "part," and the family resemblance 
to "verteilen." Pluhar's translation ofthat paragraph, which is one long sen 
tence, reads: 
For it is quite conceivable that, regardless of all the uniform 
ity of natural things in terms of the universal laws, without 
which the form of an empirical cognition in general would not 
occur at all, the specific differences in the empirical laws of 
nature, along with their effects, might still be so great that it 
would be impossible for our understanding to discover in 
nature an order it could grasp (fassen) 
? 
i.e., impossible for it to 
divide nature's products into genera and species, so as to use the 
principles by which we explain and understand one product in 
order to explain and grasp (begreifen) another as well, thereby 
making coherent experience out of material that to us is so full 
of confusion (though actually it is only infinitely diverse and 
beyond our ability to grasp [it])." (25, German verbs supplied 
by Pluhar) 
Now, it seems to me that in discussing Kant's focus on "division" into 
species, one would want to consider not only the eighteenth-century pro 
pensity to categorize nature, or the possibility of that just being the way 
the world is, but also to remember the meaning of "Urteil": to divide into 
parts. Such a choice of word does not simply express a pre-existing con 
cept, but does much of the work to establish Kant's concept of judgment as 
"division." 
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Variations on the word "division" occur several times in the immedi 
ately following paragraph, including three times in Pluhar's third sen 
tence: 
It is a law that judgment does not cognize a priori in nature, but 
that, in dividing nature's universal laws, it assumes a priori when 
it seeks to subordinate to them a diversity of particular laws, so 
that the division will have an order that our understanding can 
cognize. (25, italics mine) 
In other words: the subject judges, or divides nature, into an order cogniz 
able by the subject. Significantly, "einteilen," translated above as the verb 
"divide," also means "categorize." 
What is this law? Let us return to the beginning of this paragraph: 
Hence judgment also possesses an a priori principle for the 
possibility of nature, but one that holds only for the subject, a 
principle by which judgment prescribes, not to nature (which 
would be autonomy) but to itself (which is heautonomy), a law 
for its reflection on nature. This law could be called the law of 
the 
specification of nature in terms of its empirical laws. (25) 
It is according to the "law of the specification of nature" that the subject 
judges. But note, this is not a law prescribed to nature, but a law that the 
subject prescribes to itself: a law for the subject's own reflection on nature. 
There is in fact a law called the "law of specification." It is a Roman law 
? 
and unlike American law, German law is based on Roman law ?desig 
nating "[t]he formation of a new species of property out of material 
belonging to another by converting it into different form" (OED). 
This applies to the case at hand. Reflecting on nature, the judging sub 
ject divides and subordinates nature's laws into an order cognizable by the 
subject. In doing so, the subject appropriates nature. According to the law 
of specification, the subject may thereby have taken material belonging to 
nature, converted it to a different form, and created a new species of prop 
erty, now belonging at least in part to the subject. 
Such an appropriation of reformulated nature by the judging subject is 
expressed in my title, "The Nature of the Subject." That is, in one sense, 
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we're talking about nature as it belongs to the subject, or nature as it exists 
for the subject. But another construction is equally possible: that what is at 
stake is not nature as such, but rather the subject itself: what is the nature 
of the subject? The shifting genitive in the title is meant to recall the 
reflexivity of the Kantian relation between nature and the subject. The 
"law of the specification of nature" is, as Kant writes, "a law for the subject's 
reflection on nature." The law establishes a reflexive relation between 
nature and the subject. That is, the law for thinking about nature is a law 
that turns back, or reflects, upon the thinking subject itself. The last two 
sentences of this paragraph confirm the peculiar mediating function of this 
law: 
... we are neither ascribing a law to nature, nor learning one 
from it by observation (although observation can confirm the 
mentioned principle). For it is not a principle of determinative 
but merely of reflective judgment. (25, italics mine) 
There is here not only a reflexive relation between nature and the sub 
ject, but also between the subject and itself. The subject prescribes this rule 
to itself. This "law for the subject's reflection on nature" is presented in a 
kind of macroscopic and microscopic doubling: once between nature and 
the subject, and again between the subject and itself. 
But does Kant ever really explain how we put two and two together? 
"Observation can confirm the mentioned principle," he remarks. In Kant's 
thinking, the principle must hold, for without such "harmony" of the sub 
ject's own faculties in the Critique of Judgment, and the "harmony" between 
nature and the judging subject, we cannot proceed. This seems to me how 
ever much like the 
"harmony" of two parts of an analogy. 
Kant says about this harmony that it is a "gl?cklicher Zufall," a "fortunate 
coincidence." I was struck by the phrase, and also by the crucial position of 
this "fortunate coincidence" between two large and rival domains that are 
presented in the Introduction. As Kant writes, "It is judgment that . . . 
provides us with the concept that mediates between the concepts of nature 
and the concept of freedom" (36). Much depends upon this "fortunate 
coincidence" ? one might say, the entire structure of the Critique of Judg 
ment. 
All of this seems comparable to another crucial moment, not in philos 
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ophy, but in theology: the moment of the "fortunate fall." The language is 
similar; these two moments give rise to similar questions about the rela 
tions between determination and free will, or in Kant's thinking, 
"between the concept of nature and the concept of freedom"; and in both 
cases, everything that follows depends upon this "fortunate coincidence." 
In the Critique of Judgment, this coincidence is not seen as an absolute 
necessity but as a contingent matter?an eerie moment in the work of a 
philosopher who tries to account rationally for everything. In its language, 
in its appeal to law, in the invocation of observable harmony, and in the 
gap opened by analogy, the nature of the subject is the mystical heart of a 
rational philosophy. 
Note 
Several dictionaries were useful to me in writing this essay, notably 
Deutsches W?rterbuch by Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, Deutsches W?rterbuch 
by Hermann Paul, Duden: Das grosse W?rterbuch der deutschen Sprache, by 
G?nter Drosdowski, and Deutsches W?rterbuch, by Gerhard Wahrig. 
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